Michigan Law Review
Volume 99

Issue 6

2001

The 2000 Presidential Election: Archetype or Exception?
Michael C. Dorf
Columbia University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Election Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons,
and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael C. Dorf, The 2000 Presidential Election: Archetype or Exception?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1279 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss6/4

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
ARCHETYPE OR EXCEPTION?
Michael C. Dorf*
WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000. By Samuel lssacharoff, Pamela S.
Karlan and Richard H. Pi/des. New York: Foundation Press. 2001. Pp.

iv, 172. Paper. $9.95.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The day after the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,1 a
colleague who specializes in tax law approached me with mock sympa
thy. "It must be very discouraging trying to teach constitutional law,"
he said, "when it's so obviously made up." This view of the Court's de
cision remains widely held, at least within the academy and among
those who did not vote for President Bush. Unlike many of my fellow
Democrats and academic colleagues, however, I see no reason to
question the motives of the majority (or dissenting) Justices in Bush v.
Gore. I certainly do not think that the case casts doubt upon the very
possibility of principled constitutional adjudication. Nonetheless, I
share the widespread view that the justifications the Court offered for
its decision were quite unconvincing, and for that reason I have diffi
culty believing that the case will, as it were, have legs. Bush v. Gore is
an important case because of the stakes of the controversy it resolved,
not because of the legal principles it announced.
By contrast, Samuel Issacharoff,2 Pamela Karlan,3 and Richard
Pildes4 take the case seriously as a source of legal doctrine. They use it
as the centerpiece of a legal primer on the difficulties surrounding af-

* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. - Ed. I am
very grateful to Benjamin Alpers, Richard Briffault, Neil Buchanan, and Sherry Colb for
comments on a draft of this Review, and to Scott Chesin for research assistance. Parts of the
Introduction to this Review are adapted from a column that first appeared on Findlaw's Le
gal Commentary, at http://writ.findlaw.com(last visited May 10, 2001).

1. 531 U.S. 98(2000).
2. Harold R. Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia University
School of Law.
3. Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
School.
4. Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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ter-the-fact judicial review of election procedures. In its fair and bal
anced exposition of prior precedent and the legislative history of the
key provisions upon which the Supreme Court purported to rely in
Bush v. Gore, When Elections Go Bad provides the Court with all the
rope it needs to hang itself.5
Yet the book's very structure implies that Bush v. Gore reflects the
dilemmas that generally and inevitably arise when courts are asked to
adjudicate election disputes. It does not. Bush v. Gore is sui generis.
Because of its remarkable role in deciding a remarkable election,
however, the case is clearly worth studying closely, apart from any
general lessons one might choose to draw from it. Although When
Elections Go Bad presents the courts as struggling with recurring di
lemmas, its real strength is the light it sheds on the performance of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the Presidential election of 2000.
In Bush v. Gore, the Court's most conservative Justices announced
an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause so broad that, if gen
erally applied, it would sweep aside election procedures in a majority
of American states. A manual recount of punch card ballots was held
unconstitutional because the statutory phrase "intent of the voter" was
deemed insufficiently precise to constrain the discretion of vote count
ers.6 Yet three fundamental errors marred the Court's analysis.
5. But perhaps not all the rope that one might want. In my view, the book edits Bush v.
a bit too severely. This is my only quibble about the editing, and, happily, the authors
will correct the defect in a second edition of When Elections Go Bad, already nearly com
plete as this Review goes to press.
Gore

6. 531 U.S.at 105 ("The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions
of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary
treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida's basic command for
the count of legally cast votes is to consider the 'intent of the voter.' This is unobjectionable
as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres in the absence of
specific standards to ensure its equal application."). The Florida Supreme Court's holding,
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (2000) ("[W)e conclude that a legal vote is one in
which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the voter.' "), derived its standard from
FLA. STAT. ch. 101.5614(5) (2000) ("No vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a
clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing board."). Manual
recount statutes are in place in at least twenty-one states other than Florida. See, e. g. , CAL.
ELEC. CODE§ 15627 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 1-10.5-102(3) (2000); 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT.§ 5/24A-15.l (2000); IND. CODE § 3-12-3-13 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 50.48(4)
(1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 25-3107(b) (2000); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC.§ 13-4 (1957); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 135B (2000); MINN. R. 8235.1000 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN.§
13-16-414(3) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1119(6) (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.404(3)
(2000); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 19:53A-14 (1999); 25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3031.18 (1994);
S.D. ADMIN. R. 5:02:09:05(5) (West 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.§ 212.005(d) (1986); VT.
STAT. ANN.§ 26011 (1982); VA. CODE § 24.2-802(C) (1950); W. VA. CODE§ 3-4A-28(4)
(1999); WIS. STAT.§ 5.90 (1997-1998). See Respondent's Brief at 41 n.19, Bush, 531 U.S. 98
(No. 00-949). In most of these states, "intent of the voter" standards are the norm. See, e. g. ,
IND. CODE § 3-12-1-1; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130(d)(4), (e) (requiring vote to be
counted if "indentation" on chad or other mark indicates clearly ascertainable intent of the
voter); Stapleton v. Bd. of Elections, 821 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1987); Democratic Party. v. Bd. of
Elections, 649 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (D.V.I. 1986); Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241
(Mass. 1996); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Ill. 1990); Hickel v. Thomas, 588 P.2d
273, 274 (Alaska 1978); Wright v. Gettinger, 428 N.E.2d 1212, 1225 (Ind. 1981).
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First, the majority Justices apparently assumed that the alternative
to an imperfect manual recount was a perfect measure of the will of
the Florida electorate. Yet intercounty variations in the accuracy with
which different forms of balloting recorded voters' intent dwarfed the
variations introduced by the ambiguity of the recount standard.7 The
Court brushed aside this concern through pure ipse dixit. 8
Second, the Justices themselves bore substantial responsibility for
the Florida Supreme Court's failure to specify substandards for gaug
ing "intent of the voter." In its first foray into the 2000 Presidential
election, the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned the Florida Supreme
Court that the latter should hew closely to the letter of Florida stat
utes, lest it be found to usurp the role of the Florida legislature under
Article II, section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5.9 By
the time the case made it back to the U.S. Supreme Court less than a
week later, only three Justices were willing to endorse this view,10 but
by then the damage had been done. The Florida Supreme Court had
been intimidated into ordering a recount under the unembellished
statutory standard of "intent of the voter." This time the Florida court
was reversed for failing to gloss the statute. Heads Bush wins; tails
Gore loses - or so it appeared.
Third, and perhaps least justifiably, the U.S. Supreme Court de
termined that the counting had to cease at midnight, December 1 2,
2000, barely two hours after it issued its decision. The Court located
this deadline in what it termed the Florida Supreme Court's statement
"that the [state] legislature intended the State's electors to 'partici
pat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,' "11 by taking advantage of
the safe harbor 3 U.S.C. § 5 provides against challenges in Congress.
Yet Florida's statutes nowhere stated a preference for the safe harbor
deadline over an accurate count, nor did the Florida Supreme Court
ever attribute such a preference to it.12 Even Florida Supreme Court
Justice Shaw, who dissented from his court's December 8 decision or-

7. For example, the optical-scanner vote-counting system used in forty-one of Florida's
sixty-seven counties resulted in only a 0.3% undervote rate, compared to a 1.5% rate in
counties using punch card ballots. See Brief for Respondent at 43, Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (No. 00949); Pet. App., Exh. A, submitted with petition in Touchston v. McDermott (Dec. 8, 2000);
Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1140 n.16 (11th Cir. 2000).
8. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 ("The question before the Court is not whether local enti
ties, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elec
tions.").
9.
10.

See Bush

v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).

See Gore,

531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).

11. Id. at 113 (per curiam opinion) (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000)); see also Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
·

"

12. The language quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court appeared in a discussion of the
Florida Secretary of State's authority to reject late election returns.
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dering manual recounts, later opined that "December 1 2 was not a
'drop-dead' date under Florida law."13 Thus, on the question of re
count standards, three of the Justices in the 5-4 Bush v. Gore majority
were unwilling to accord the Florida Supreme Court anything like the
deference state courts customarily receive as expositors of state law.
On the critical deadline question, however, they were willing to defer
to a decision the Florida Supreme Court never made, interpreting
Florida statutory text that did not exist.
The high stakes and the unpersuasiveness of the reasons given by
the Supreme Court for its decision in Bush v. Gore have led many ob
servers to conclude that the case cannot be understood in anything but
political terms.14 By "political," the Court's critics do not merely mean
that the Justices voted on the basis of their values or ideologies rather
than in accord with neutral principles. There are, after all, numerous
instances of Justices adopting one principle in one set of cases and its
opposite in another. Most prominently, the Court's conservatives at
tack judicial activism in the service of reproductive rights,15 gay
rights,16 and church-state separation,17 while practicing judicial activ
ism in the service of states' rights,18 colorblindness,19 and associational
freedom.20 And the liberals practice judicial activism in cases involving
the first set of issues while attacking it in cases involving the second
set.21 But it is at least possible to articulate a vision of the Constitution
that sanctions greater judicial solicitude for one constellation of values
than for another. By contrast, in Bush v. Gore, the Justices appeared
to strain legal logic in the service of a particular candidate for office
rather than in the service of a larger constitutional vision.
Many difficult questions of constitutional law have no single, obvi
ously correct answer. Should the limits on Congress's power be en
forceable by courts, and if so, what are those limits? Do courts have
13. See Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d, 524 (Fla. 2000). When Elections Go Bad does not in
clude the Florida Supreme Court's response to the U.S. Supreme Court's remand in Bush v.
Gore.
14. See 673 Law Professors Say, at http://www.the-rule-of-law.com/statement.html (last
visited July 11, 2001) (accusing the Bush v. Gore majority of "acting as political proponents
for candidate Bush, not judges").
15. See Stenberg
16. See Romer

v. Carhart,

v. Evans,

530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia,

517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,

17. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
senting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).

J., dissenting).

J., dissenting).

290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist,

18. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel
528 U.S. 62 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
19. See Adarand

Constructors v. Pena,

20. See Boy Scouts
530 U.S. 567 (2000).

of Am. v. Dale,

C.J., dis

v. Florida Bd. of Regents,

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

530 U.S. 640 (2000);

Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones,

21. See Michael. C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the
Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741, 746-48 (2000).
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the power to enforce rights not expressly spelled out in the Constitu
tion's text, and if so, which rights? (The right to choose abortion? The
right to exclude homosexuals from private associations?) Does af
firmative action remedy violations of the Equal Protection Clause, or
does it actually violate the Clause? In the wake of legal realism, it
would be foolish to suggest that anyone could answer such questions
without relying in some measure on his or her own somewhat subjec
tive value judgments.
Yet, as I often tell my students as they are studying for exams, the
fact that a question has no single right answer does not mean that it
. has no wrong answers. Constitutional provisions, statutes, and prece
dents rule out certain results, even as they leave open a range of le
gitimate results. The constitutionality of some forms of affirmative ac
tion and school vouchers are open questions; the constitutionality of
slavery and an official church of the United States are not. The prob
lem with Bush v. Gore is not that the Court made a poor choice among
a range of legitimate options. The problem is that the Court appeared
to choose a result from almost completely outside that range. For this
reason, the case is an awkward vehicle for exploring the general
problem of judicial review ofelections, or anything else.
To reiterate, I am not adding my name to the list of those who
have accused the Court of partisanship. Who can ever know another's
true motives, or even his own? Intriguingly, two of the authors of
When Elections Go Bad have written separate essays that locate Bush
v. Gore in lines of cases with a less partisan.bent,22 and undoubtedly
the Justices saw themselves as simply performing their duty.. Yet the
pure heart defense only goes so far. Ultimately, the Court must be
judged by its deeds, not its motives.
II.

ORGANIZATION

When Elections Go Bad fills a gap in the authors' casebook, The
Law of Democracy.23 The latter "focused more on institutional ar
rangements than on the nuts-and-bolts of casting votes and having
them counted" (p. 2). The organization of When Elections Go Bad
suggests that it is intended either as an extended supplement for a
course in election law or as a stand-alone work on the law of the cast
ing, counting, and litigating of votes. But the book's content and its
timing - published less than a month after the Supreme Court's rul-

22. See Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v.
Reno to Bush v. Gore, 34 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy
and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695(2001).
23. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1998). A second edition of the principal casebook will be avail
able soon. It incorporates an updated version of When Elections Go Bad as a single chapter:
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ing in Bush v. Gore
make the book especially useful as a tool for
understanding the legal issues in the 2000 Presidential election.
Nevertheless, the authors have followed the usual course for case
books, organizing the material thematically. The book consists of a
short foreword followed by four chapters: (1) The Federal Interest in
Election Procedures; (2) When Should Federal Courts Intervene?; (3)
The State Interest in Federal Elections; and (4) Remedial Possibilities
for Defective Elections.
Throughout the book, the authors use the 2000 Presidential elec
tion to illustrate more general points about election law, but this
seems backwards. Ordinarily, the case method of legal instruction uses
individual cases to illustrate general propositions, because it is under
stood that the general propositions are more important than any par
ticular application. Not so here, where one application dwarfs all oth
ers. For example, even assuming that punch card ballots remain in use
for some substantial period, any future dispute over whether dimpled
chads should count as votes is extremely unlikely to have anything like
the significance it had in the 2000 Presidential election. The same is
true of nearly every hotly contested issue in the postelection contro
versy.
For telling the legal story of the 2000 Presidential election, a
chronological organization might have served better.24 For one thing, it
would have revealed just how much of the problem in Florida was due
to the U.S. Supreme Court's mishandling of the case. In light of what
came next, the Court's worst move may have been its initial decision
to deny certiorari on then-Governor Bush's proposed third question:
"Whether the use of arbitrary, standardless and selective manual re
counts" violates the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Nearly three weeks
elapsed between the certiorari denial and the Court's eventual ruling
in Bush's favor on just that question.26 Had the Court handled the case
more expeditiously from the start, there might have been time for a
recount, even under the Court's stringent standard and made-up
deadline.27
There is a certain logic to the postelection litigation as presented in
When Elections Go Bad that belies the wild unpredictability of the
postelection litigation process as it was experienced in real time. As I
-

24. The second edition will be organized more or less chronologically.
25. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Katherine Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000),
George W. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 2000
U.S. Briefs 836 (LEXIS) (U.S. Nov. 22, 2000)(No. 00-836).
petition for cert. filed sub nom.

26. George W. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004, 1004 (2001)
("Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida granted on Questions 1 and
2 as presented by the petition.").
27. See Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court Pulled a Bait and Switch, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2000, at Bll.
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have just noted, the Court's initial denial of review on the third certio
rari question was, at the time, a partial defeat for Bush, although by
dragging matters out it ended up immensely aiding him. Likewise,
when the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Florida Secretary of State
Katherine Harris lacked the discretion to exclude delayed returns
from the certified total,28 the decision was· viewed as a major victory
for Gore.29 Yet that decision ended up proving ruinous to his case for
two reasons. First, by extending the protest phase of postelection
challenges, the decision necessarily shortened the contest phase, thus
enabling the U.S. Supreme Court to invoke the December 12 "dead
line" at a point at which it was too late for anything to be done. Sec
ond, in order to find that Harris was obligated to accept late returns,
the Florida Supreme Court needed to construe Florida statutes crea
tively - and its willingness to do so may have led five Justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court to view all of the output of the Florida high court
with extreme suspicion.30
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD

The two greatest strengths of When Elections Go Bad are the
authors' illuminating notes and questions and the primary materials
the book collects, including some marvelous tidbits.
My favorite passage is a quotation of Senator Sherman, the princi
pal supporter of the 1886 Electoral Count Act, which includes the
now-infamous 3 U.S.C. § 5. Explaining why Congress was the appro
priate body to resolve a future dispute of the sort that arose in the
Presidential election of 1876, Senator Sherman stated that he had con
sidered lodging this power in the Supreme Court, but concluded that
this would be unwise. He presciently explained:
It would be a very grave fault indeed and a very serious objection to refer
a political question in which the people of the country were aroused,
about which their feelings were excited, to this great tribunal, which after

28. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1237 ("[W]e conclude that the
authority of the Florida Secretary of State to ignore amended returns submitted by a County
Canvassing Board may be lawfully exercised only under limited circumstances.").
29. See, e.g., Dan Baiz & Peter Slevin, Fla. Justices Say Vote Totals Must Include Hand
Recounts: Court Sets Deadline, Overrules Harris, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2000, at AOl; Joe
Battenfeld & David R. Guarino, Count On! Court OKs Hand Recounts, Boosting Gore's
Chances, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 22, 2000, at 001; Jim Drinkard, Florida Supreme Court
Allows Hand Recounts: Momentous Ruling a Victory for Gore: Bush May Appeal, U SA
TODAY, November 22, 2000, at lA; Jan Crawford Greenburg, Florida Judges Put People's
Right to Vote Above All Else, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 2000, at Nl.
30. Another surprising tum of events came after President Bush took office, when one
of the early journalist-conducted recounts revealed that he would have won a recount con
ducted under the Florida Supreme Court's standard, whereas Gore would have won under
the standard advocated by Bush, albeit by only three (three!) votes. See Martin Merzer, Re
view Shows Ballots Say Bush, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 2001, at Al.
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all has to sit upon the life and property of all the people of the United
States. It would tend to bring that court into public odium of one or the
other of the two great parties.31

To similar effect is Fourth Circuit Judge Wilkinson's explanation
in a 1986 case denying a civil RICO claim for damages brought by un
successful candidates for state and federal offices in West Virginia. Af
ter noting that the House of Representatives had then recently exer
cised its power to resolve .a disput,e concerning the election of one of
its members, he stated:
The partisan and acrimonious nature of that debate only reaffirms the
wisdom of avoiding judicial embroilment and of leaving disputed politi
cal outcomes to the legislative branch. Had the framers wished the fed
eral judiciary to umpire election contests, they could have so provided.
Instead, they reposed primary trust in popular representatives and in po
litical correctives.32

Through their notes and questions, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes
sometimes suggest that they agree with Senator Sherman, Judge
Wilkinson, and the original Framers that federal courts should not
adjudicate after-the-fact election disputes, except perhaps as a last re
sort. Yet that proposition is hardly obvious. As Senator Sherman him
self observed, even in the nineteenth century, other democratic coun
tries routinely assigned this function to their courts.33 In modern times,
most democracies have seen fit to insulate the electoral process itself
from politics by granting extensive powers to independent commis
sions and courts.34 As a matter of first-order institutional design, this
may well be the better approach.
31. P. 62(quoting 17 CONG. REC. 817-18(1886)(statement of Sen. Sherman)).
32. P. 165 (quoting Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 1284(4th Cir. 1986)).
33. P. 62 (quoting 17 CONG. REC. 817-18 (1886) (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("I be
lieve, however, that it is the provision made in other countries.")).
34. Consider four examples, from the dozens that could be cited:
1) Elections Canada is "an independent, non-partisan agency reporting directly to Canada's
Parliament." The agency "is ... responsible for conducting federal general elections, by
elections and referendums." What We Do, at http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section=
eca&document=abo&lang=e&textonly=false(last modified Nov. 22, 2000).
2) India's 1947 Constitution created the Election Commission of India, an independent body
whose members are appointed by parliament, serve for fixed, six-year terms, and are remov
able only through impeachment. The Commission oversees voter and candidate eligibility,
party registration, funding, balloting, and vote counting for the world's largest democracy.
See Election Com mission of India, at http://www.eci.gov.in/infoeci/about_eci/abouteci_
fs.htm(last visited July 18, 2001).
3) The Australian Electoral Commission is another independent body charged with the
oversight of democratic elections. The Commission
is responsible for conducting all aspects of a national election. It maintains the electoral rolls
and enforces the compulsory enrolment; promotes public awareness of electoral and parlia
mentary matters; conducts research into electoral matters; publishes materials relating to the
election procedures; and reports to the Minister on electoral matters . . . . The regulation of
elections and election campaigns by the commission is for the purpose of not only producing
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As a descriptive matter, however, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes
are surely correct. Our Federal Election Commission is a very weak
body with jurisdiction limited to enforcement of ineffective campaign
finance laws,35 and, Bush v. Gore notwithstanding, Congress, rather
than the Supreme Court, has primary responsibility for refereeing dis
putes over the outcome of federal elections.
This is not to say that American courts previously played no role in
resolving elections. State courts in particular played a substantial one,
even in federal elections. In its chapter on remedies, When Elections
Go Bad gives two spectacular examples.
In one, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court examined the
punch card ballots in a Congressional primary, counted dimpled chads
under an intent-of-the-voter standard, and concluded that the candi
date who had trailed by 175 votes after a machine count netted 376
votes, thus winning the election.36 In another, a California appellate
court overruled a trial court because the latter had erroneously ap
proved the inclusion in the total balloting of the vote of one citizen
who had recently moved. Because that citizen had testified that he had
voted in favor of the contested ballot initiative, his vote was subtracted
from the total yes vote. Where the machine count had produced a two
vote defeat of the initiative, and the trial court had converted that reequitable distribution with regard to represc;mtation, but also to encourage fairness in the
competition process. This involves providing for neutral election officials, enforcing the laws
against bribery, and misleading advertisements, and the regulation of financing for elections.
Robert L. Nay, Australia, in CAMPAIGN FINANCING OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES, 25, 25-38 (Law Library of Congress ed., 1991) [hereinafter FOREIGN
COUNTRIES].
4) Japan's electoral laws are arguably the strongest of any modem democracy, but there is
no independent agency charged with enforcing those laws. Sung Yoon Cho, Japan, in
FOREIGN COUNTRIES, supra, at 126 ("Japanese election campaigns, including campaign fi
nancing, are governed by a set of comprehensive laws that are the most restrictive among
democratic nations."). Japan's courts, however, are given wide latitude to enforce election
laws. See The Political Funds Control Law of 1948, Law. No. 194 of 1948, as last amended by
Law No. 81 of 1982; Public Office Election Law of 1950, Law. No. 100 of 1950, as last
amended by Law No. 94 of 1988.
35. See BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION FAILED 2 (1990) ("The FEC's weak enforcement has made the campaign fi
nance laws a fraud on the public."); GREG D. KUBIAK, THE GILDED DOME: THE UNITED
STATES SENATE AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 229(1994); Carol Mallory & Elizabeth
Hedlund, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, ENFORCING THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAWS: AN AGENCY MODEL 1-5 (1993) (criticizing current FEC enforcement for weak and
ineffective procedures and presenting alternative model campaign finance enforcement
agency); Colloquy, Election Campaign Finance Reform: Federal Election Comm ission Panel
Discussion: Problems and Possibilities, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 223 (1994) (discussing short
comings of FEC processes); Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance
Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 279 (1991) (criticizing cur
rent FEC compliance mechanisms and providing recommendations for improving FEC en
forcement); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1711 (1999).
36.

See Delahunt

v. Johnston, 423 Mass. 731 (1996),

reprinted at pp. 126-28.
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suit into a one-vote victory, the appeals court found a tie, meaning the
initiative failed. 37
Although elections this close are no doubt unusual, it is precisely
the close elections that lead to calls for recounts, and Issacharoff,
Karlan, and Pildes describe the Massachusetts case, at least, as "fairly
typical" (p. 126). They also describe manual recounts performed by
the United States Senate that aimed to discern "the true intent of the
voter," including a partial r,ecount . in 1974 (p. 27). Given such prece
dents, the Bush v. Gore majority's consternation in the face of un
guided discretion in the counting of punch card ballots is rather mysti
fying. Were all of these prior recounts under similarly general criteria
also unconstitutional? The Court did not say.
While much of the material presented in When Elections Go Bad
undermines the arguments made by the Supreme Court in Bush v.
Gore, the book opens with a line of precedent that arguably supports
the Court. The first principal case is a 1995 Eleventh Circuit decision
in which the court found a violation of due process where, in an elec
tion for state offices, an Alabama court counted absentee ballots that
had not been notarized or properly witnessed as required by Alabama
election law.38 The court ruled that such .a "retroactive change" vio
lated "fundamental fairness."39 As Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes ob
serve, this very broad view of the role of federal courts with respect to
state election law explains "why lawyers for the Bush campaign
pressed so ardently to draw the Eleventh Circuit into the Florida dis
pute" (p. 10). Yet even as the case casts light on the Bush litigation
strategy, it poses a puzzle about the Supreme Court's behavior: Why
did those Justices who ruled for Bush rely on unprecedented (and un
persuasive) views of equal protection and Article II, when they might
have invoked seemingly apposite due process precedent from the very
circuit that encompasses Florida?
Through their questions and comments, lssacharoff, Karlan, and
Pildes suggest an answer: the Eleventh Circuit's own rule would be un
tenable if generally applied because it would threaten to federalize
every question of state election law. In the Alabama case itself, the
federal district court and Eleventh Circuit detected a clear break with
prior consistent practice; by contrast, prior to the 2000 election,
Florida's election laws had not been applied to a statewide electoral
contest in over eighty years (pp. 17-20). Thus, a federal court judg
ment that Florida had departed from its own laws would have rested
on nothing but a disposition to read Florida statutes differently from

37.
128.

See

Escalante

38.

See Roe

39.

Id.

v.

at 581,

v.

City of Hermosa Beach, 241 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1987),

Alabama, 43 F.3d 574(11th Cir. 1995),
reprinted at p.

12.

reprinted at pp.

reprinted at p.

11-15.
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the Florida courts. As lssacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes ask rhetorically,
"if the federal courts can do no more than simply issue their own in
terpretations of how· best to read state law, can such a difference of
view ever rise to the level of the 'patent' unfairness that is required for
a federal constitutional interest in the process?" (p. 20).
This is a fair criticism. A U.S. Supreme Court opinion relying on
the Eleventh Circuit's due process rule would have been unjustifiable.
Yet it would have been no more unjustifiable than the actual decision
in Bush v. Gore, for the equal protection standard the majority an
nounced also threatens to inject a federal issue into every state elec
tion. Similarly, it is no less arbitrary for a federal court to substitute its
reading of state law for that of the state courts under the nominal aus
pices of Article II - as three Justices did in Bush v. Gore
than un
der the Due Process Clause.
Perhaps the majority Justices relied on Article II and equal protec
tion rather than due process because of the haste with which they
needed to decide the case and issue their opinion. Bush v. Gore was
handed down less than two days after it was argued. By way of com
parison, even working at lightning speed, Issacharoff, Karlan, and
Pildes took nearly two weeks from the date of the decision until they
submitted their final manuscript to the publisher, whereas I spent a
leisurely two and a half months working on this Essay, and the editors
of the Michigan Law Review spent a still longer period editing it and
checking citations. Given this upside-down allocation of time, it is not
surprising that the Court's chosen legal theories do not survive close
scrutiny.
In any event, to fault the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore for pick
ing one rather than another unconvincing doctrinal explanation for its
decision misses the point. By December 12, 2001, five Justices appar
ently believed that the Florida Supreme Court was determined to
throw the nation into chaos rather than to let a Bush victory stand,
and that they alone could rescue us. But the Court's conventions did
not permit it to invoke such frankly pragmatic considerations, leaving
it only inadequate doctrinal grounds to justify its action.40
-

40. I do not mean to suggest that the Court's hypothesized concern about stability was
warranted. Had a recount left Bush in the lead, that would have been the end of the matter.
Had Gore overtaken Bush, political pressure might have.forced a Bush concession, and if it
had not, there is no reason to think that Congressional resolution of the election would have
threatened the nation's stability. My point is that if the Court was "taking a bullet" for the
country, it should have said so. But cf RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK:
THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS(2001) Uustifying Bush v. Gore
on pragmatic grounds wholly unexpressed by the per curiam or concurring opinion).
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IV. LESSONS
What lessons can we learn from the 2000 Presidential election? In
the heat of the moment, many legal commentators viewed the pos
telection saga as merely confirming their prior views.
For Cass Sunstein, the Supreme Court's initial unanimous per
curiam remand to the Florida Supreme Court was a wisely "minimal
ist" decision.41 This was a spectacularly poor assessment. By papering
over internal divisions with an opinion that falsely suggested there
were five Justices prepared to base their decision on a nonretroactivity
principle rooted in Article II and 3 U.S.C. § 5, the minimalist character
of the opinion wasted precious time and trapped the Florida high
court.42
For Jeffrey Toobin, the postelection litigation confirmed his view
that the legal system and the political system had merged - for the
worse.43 Toobin had previously identified that merger as the root
problem with the events leading up to President Clinton's impeach
ment.44 Yet in an important respect, the phenomena are almost polar
opposites. In the impeachment iSaga, the Supreme Court stood by
while politically motivated actors used the legal system for political
gain.45 In the postelection litigation, the Supreme Court prevented
both the state legal system and the state and national legal and politi
cal systems from performing the roles assigned to them. Far from the
culmination of a longstanding trend, Bush v. Gore was a shock to
many of the most seasoned Court-watchers precisely because it ap
peared to be political. Had law and politics really already merged in
the way that Toobin claims, Bush v. Gore would have been under
stood as simply business as usual.
In some sense, of course, Bush v. Gore was consistent with prior
Rehnquist Court opinions. As Larry Kramer wrote in the wake of the
Court's 5-4 decision to stay the manual recount but before its final
ruling, "conservative judicial activism is the order of the day. The
Warren Court was retiring compared to the present one."46 The point
41. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT(1996); see also
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT(1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Broad Virtue in a Modest Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2000, at A29; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4(1996).
42.

See supra text

accompanying notes 9-10;

see also Dorf, supra note

27.

43.

See Jeffrey Toobin, The Counting House: Have the Presidency and Litigation Be
come Perm anently Entwined?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 4, 2000, at 42.

44. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, A vAST CONSPIRACY: THE REAL STORY OF THE SEX
SCANDAL THAT NEARLY. BROUGHT DOWN A PRESIDENT(1999).
45.

See Clinton

v.

Jones, 520 U.S. 681(1997).

46. Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise.
A33.

It's an Activist Court,

N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at
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is a fair one,47 but neither the initial stay nor the ultimate disposition in
Bush v. Gore was conservative in the conventional sense. By contrast,
some of the Court's most activist, conservative decisions have actually
frustrated the institutional interests of the Republican Party. Most
prominently, the majority-minority districts that were invalidated by
Shaw v. Reno48 and its progeny were frequently created with the
blessing of southern Republicans who hoped to "pack" African
Americans into such districts,' thereby dili.Iting the strength of the
Democratic Party in the remaining districts.49 Whatever one thinks of
the Rehnquist Court's activist pursuit of colorblind electoral district
ing, it is activism in the service of a principle, not a party.
The authors of When Elections Go Bad do not entirely escape the
tendency of other commentators to see in the 2000 Presidential elec
tion a confirmation of their previously held views. The tendency is less
pronounced, however, because the substantive views of the book's
authors - who undoubtedly disagree among themselves on some key
questions - are not entirely obvious. Indeed, writing in these pages
two years ago, Burt Neuborne criticized Issacharoff, Karlan, and
Pildes for failing to develop a normative account of democracy.50
Yet, as Neuborne's own review illustrates, the authors' first book
did embrace a more limited theory, one of the proper role of courts in
policing the democratic process. Neuborne thought that too much of
the first book was devoted to the legal mechanisms by which minority
voters may challenge electoral practices.51 This focus on the rights of
minority voters is hardly disproportionate given the theory implicit in
both The Law of Democracy and When Elections Go Bad - broadly
speaking, the theory of the Carolene Products footnote,52 the Warren

47. In my view, conservative and liberal judicial activism is the order of the day. See
Michael C. Dorf, They Are All Activists Now, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20000501.html(May 1, 2000).
48. 509 U.S. 630(1993).
49. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 582: ("Republicans were delighted to
pack pro-Democratic minority voters into new majority-minority districts, thereby drawing
away from the electoral strength of Democratic incumbents."). For a more cynical view of
most of the output of the Rehnquist Court, see Mark V. Tushnet, A Repub lican Chief
Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328 (1990) (reviewing SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989)) ("One could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's bottom-line results by looking, not at anything in the United States Re
ports, but rather at the platforms of the Republican Party.").
50. Burt Neubome, Making the Law Safe for Democracy: A Review of "The Law of
MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1589-90 (1999) (book review) (complaining that
the book "purports to deal with the law of democracy without engaging in a normative in
quiry as to what conception of democracy the courts should seek to defend").
Democracy Etc.", 97

51. See id. at 1584-85(discussing the pre-clearance mechanism of section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act).
52. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4(1938).
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Court, and John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust.53 In a nutshell,
courts can and should take action to assist democracy, but only when
the democratic process cannot cure its own defects. And that circum
stance is most likely to obtain when political divisions reflect racial
ones.
Seen from this vantage point, the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore was wrong because it was unnecessary. The Electoral
Count Act meant that Congress could have resolved the matter with
out judicial interference. Although lssacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes do
not say so explicitly, their account also suggests that the Florida
Supreme Court erred in ordering manual recounts given they believe
that the Florida legislature was prepared to resolve the issue.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION

Like the classical process theory of Carotene Products, Earl War
ren, and John Hart Ely, the implicit process theory of The Law of
Democracy and When Elections Go Bad envisions a circumscribed
role for judges. It is not that Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes trust poli
ticians. As they state very early in When Elections Go Bad, "[t]here is
little reason to believe that partisan officials will cease to be that if
they are given the chance to interpret or even alter the rules of the
game after the election has occurred" (p. 3).
The problem for the authors of When Elections Go Bad is that
"just as the partisan effects of all potential courses of action are known
to partisan political officials, so too are they known to judges who
must adjudicate electoral challenges. The adjudication of claims that
will alter the outcomes of high-profile elections threatens significant
damage to the integrity of courts" (p. 3). Given the choice between
two flawed sets of institutions, why not have a strong presumption that
matters should be left to the politicians, whose judgments are at least
subject to review in the political process? That rhetorical question is
the subtext of When Elections Go Bad.54

53. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Of course, the authors of When Elections Go Bad disagree with Ely on various par
ticulars, see, e.g. , Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Comm entary: Standing and Mis
understanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998), but on the whole their
work is sympathetic to the project of selectively using judicial power to bolster democracy.
See, e. g. , ISACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 11-12 ("When politicians who have been
elected under one set of rules are asked to change the existing rules, there might be good
reason to distrust their incentives."); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 709-10 (1998)
(extending "Ely's pioneering work").
(1980).

54. The authors' skepticism of federal judicial intervention is most apparent in their
notes and questions on the demise of abstention doctrines in federal court decisions involv
ing elections. Pp. 57-62.
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But do the facts of the 2000 Presidential election controversy really
support the view that politicians are no worse than judges in referee
ing electoral disputes? From the very beginning of the Florida recount
imbroglio, elected officials consistently took whatever positions would
advance the interest of their party's candidate. The Democratic
Attorney General supported the Gore campaign.55 The Republican
Secretary of State supported the Bush campaign: first she denied that
she had any discretion to accept late votes;56 then when instructed that
she had such discretion, she categorically declined to exercise it;57 and
finally, when instructed that the categorical denial was abusive, she
rigidly enforced a deadline so as to minimize Gore votes.58
More ominously, the Florida legislature was fully prepared to take
a party-line vote that would have given the state's electors to Bush, re
gardless of the result of any court-ordered recount.59 We do not know
to a certainty that Congress would have acted in a similarly partisan
55. See, e. g . , Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Barstow, Counting the Vote: The Canvassing
Boards: Election Officials Focus of Lobbying From Both Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000,
at Al ("[I]n Volusia County, the only Florida county to complete a full hand recount, the
state's attorney general, Robert A. Butterworth, placed an unsolicited phone call a week ago
to elections officials, advising them that they had the legal authority to go forward with a
manual recount."); Mireya Navarro, Counting the Vote: The Attorney General: A Staunch
Gore Ally Influences Florida Ballot Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A27.
56. Press Release, Katherine Harris, Statement of Katherine Harris, Secretary of State
(Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/flll-14deadline.pdf (last visited
May 11, 2001) ("In order to effectuate the public's right to clarity and finality, the law unam
biguously states when the process of counting and recounting the votes cast on election day
must end." Ms. Harris claimed that the only discretion provided by the law is for emergen
cies such as hurricanes. An unusually close election, she said, is not an emergency.); see also
Alan Judd, Florida Official Refuses to Extend Vote Deadline: Gore Team Decries "Arb itrary"
Decision, ATLANTA]. & CONST., Nov. 13, 2000, at lA.
57. Katherine Harris, Remarks denying county requests to add hand-counted ballot to
tals (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/harris11_15_deny.html (last
accessed May 11, 2001); see also Richard L. Berke, Counting the Votes: The Overview: Re
publican Rejects Offer that 2 Sides Accept a Count by Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at
Al ("Ms. Harris . . . announced . . . that it was 'my duty under Florida law' to reject requests
from several counties to update their totals.").
58. After ten days of counting over 400,000 ballots, Palm Beach County submitted its
amended returns to Secretary Harris 78 minutes late. She refused to accept them, in a move
characterized by canvassing board chairman Charles Burton as a "slap in the face." Todd J.
Gillman, Palm Beach Comes up Just Short: Recount 78 Minutes Late: Vote Rejection Called
"Slap," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 27, 2000, at lA; Jeff Shields & Brad Hahn, Palm
Beach County Misses Deadline, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 27, 2000, at lA.
59. JOHN MCKAY & TOM FEENEY, THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE JOINT
PROCLAMATION (Dec. 6, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/
proclamation.pdf (last accessed May 11, 2001); see also David Barstow, Contesting the Vote:
The Florida Legislature: Florida Lawmakers Moving to Bypass Courts for Bush: Judge Bars a
Quick Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at Al. Candidate Bush's brother, Governor Jeb
Bush, soon expressed his support for the plan. David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Contest
ing the Vote: The Florida Legislature: Florida Governor Backs Lawm akers' Efforts to Bypass
Courts and Select Electors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at A27 (quoting Florida Governor

Bush saying it would be an "act of courage" for the state legislature to name its own slate of
electors).
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fashion, but perhaps that is only because the Supreme Court denied
Congress the opportunity.
Although hardly above reproach, in general the courts did not act
in quite so partisan a fashion as the politicians during the 2000 Presi
dential election controversy. The Democratic trial judge who initially
ruled that Secretary of State Harris had the discretion to certify late
returns handed the Bush campaign a victory by subsequently ruling
that she did not abuse her discretion in excluding those returns.60 The
heavily Democratic Florida Supreme Court was accused of partisan
ship for its decision reversing that judgment,61 but the Florida Supreme
Court itself later split on whether to order manual recounts in the con
test phase, and that split was not on party lines.62 Even the Florida
Supreme Court Justices who sided with Gore ordered a remedy that
was hardly certain to result in a victory for him - manual counting of
"under-votes" in counties that went for Bush as well as those that
went for Gore.63
It is also worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices did not
divide strictly on party lines. Republican appointees Stevens and
Souter sided with Gore. In addition, although he would have ruled for
Gore with respect to the remedy, Democratic appointee Breyer found
some merit in Bush's equal protection argument.64 But even if one
were willing to condemn the Court's majority for partisanship in Bush
60. Compare McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
14, 2000) (order granting in part and denying in part motion of temporary injunction), avail
able at http://election2000.stanford.edu/McDermottHarris.pdf (last accessed May 11, 2001),
with McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1714590 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 2000) (or
der denying emergency motion to compel compliance with and for enforcement of injunc
tion), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/2700af.pdf (last accessed May 11, 2001).
61. Bush spokesman (and former Secretary of State) James Baker was particularly
harsh: "Two weeks after the election, (the Florida Supreme Court] has changed the rules,
and has invented a riew system for counting the election results," he said at a news confer
ence on November 22. Remarks by James Baker (Nov. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/election_night/112200/baker_statement.sml (last accessed May 11,
2001) (criticizing Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000)
(per curiam), reprinted at pp. 78-89).
62. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).The Florida Supreme Court split 4-3,
with Justices Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and Quince in the majority, see id. at 1247, and Chief
Justice Wells, and Justices Harding and Shaw dissenting. See id. at 1262 (Wells, C.J., dis
senting); id. at 1270 (Harding, J., dissenting). All seven justices were appointed to the
Florida Supreme Court by Democratic governors: Chief Justice Wells and Justices Harding,
Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and Quice by Gov. Lawton Chiles, and Justice Shaw by Governor
Bob Graham. (Quince's appointment was also sponsored by Governor Bush, whose term
began shortly after the appointment.)
63. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1247. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently criticized the
Florida Supreme Court for not also ordering recounts of "overvotes." See Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S.98, 109 (2000).
64. Bush, 531 U.S. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority's (equal protection]
concern does implicate principles of fundamental fairness . . . I agree that, in these very spe
cial circumstances, basic principles of fairness may well have counseled the adoption of a
uniform standard to address the problem.").
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v. Gore, it would not follow that courts lack any systematic advantage
over politicians. Federal judges are insulated from political pressure
by life tenure and salary protection, while independence is a cardinal
judicial virtue at all levels. Of course, any institutional arrangement
can be subverted by human failings. The key question is what are the
odds.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States Constitution was flawed from the outset - not
just morally flawed because it condoned slavery, but institutionally in
complete because of the Framers' failure to anticipate the develop
ment of political parties. The two-party system arose in the United
States partly as a response to Duverger's Law,65 but also to fill a prac
tical need. The Madisonian strategy of dividing power to prevent tyr
anny carries with it a well-known concomitant danger of government
paralysis,66 as each institution frustrates the will of the others. By facili
tating coordination among the branches and levels of government, po
litical parties reduce the risk of gridlock.67
The original Constitution's mechanism for selecting a President
quickly broke down in the face of political parties, leading to the
deadlocked election of 1800. Although the Twelfth Amendment
remedied the particular problem that had caused the deadlock, politi
cal parties continue to fit awkwardly in our constitutional system. This
awkwardness is apparent in cases involving the institutional interests
of parties as such,68 as well as in the 2000 Presidential election contro
versy.
If elected bodies are assigned the task of adjudicating high-stakes
partisan contests, there is a substantial risk that the political parties
will capture the organs of government, converting the latter into mere
agents of the former. Even if varied constituencies and shifting coali
tions lead to bipartisan compromise on other issues, with respect to
after-the-fact adjudication of close elections, party discipline will be
the order of the day. The risk of capture appears to have been realized
65. Maurice Duverger postulated "that systems in which office is awarded to a candidate
who receives the most votes . . . in a single-ballot election will produce a two-party political
system, rather than a multi-party one." ISACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 715.
66. See WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
200 (1908) ("[T]he danger of coordinate and coequal powers such as the framers of the
Constitution had set up was that they might at their will pull in opposite directions and hold
the government at a deadlock which no constitutional force could overcome.").
67. Larry Kramer nicely illustrates how political parties coordinate policy between the
state and federal levels. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215(2000).
68. For example, in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), self
declared textualist Antonin Scalia found himself relying on an unenumerated right of politi
cal association to invalidate California's blanket primary.
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in Florida, and likely would have also been realized at the national
level, if given the chance.
The resulting battle of institutions was not, however, a classic in
stance of Madisonian checks and balances, but more nearly its oppo
site. The Madisonian system of checks and balances depends upon
government bodies pursuing discrete institutional interests rather than
the interest of whichever party happens to control a given body. For
example, even when the same party controls the Senate and the
House, legislation frequently passes one body but founders in the
other, because House and Senate members are elected for different
terms, serve different constituencies, and develop cross-party working
relationships with different colleagues. When parties capture the insti
tutions, however, the only question that matters is which party con
trols the institution with the final move. In the case of the 2000 Presi
dential election, the answer to that question was almost certainly the
Republican Party.69
That answer is not in itself distressing, except to partisans. If party
loyalty is ever going to take priority over institutional loyalty, it will be
during partisan political contests. The problem arises because neither
our Constitution nor our laws expressly provide for a neutral referee
of partisan political contests.
Given this gap, it was understandable that a clear majority of
Americans thought that the United States Supreme Court was the
only institution with the detachment and prestige to resolve the elec
tion dispute impartially.70 That it proved incapable of doing so con-

69. The Electoral Count Act provides that in the event that a state names more than
one slate of Presidential electors, each House of Congress must make a choice. See 3 U.S.C.
§ 15(2000). The Republican-controlled House almost certainly would have chosen the Bush
electors while, assuming strict party discipline, the evenly divided Senate would have chosen
the Gore electors by virtue of Gore's own tie-breaking vote. At that point, the election
would have turned on which slate of electors bore the signature of the Florida executive, Jeb
Bush. See id.
70. In a Gallup poll conducted between August 29 and September 5, 2000, 62% of
Americans claimed they "approve[d] of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job."
Forty seven percent of those surveyed claimed to have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of con
fidence in the Supreme Court, compared to 46% for organized religion, 64% for the U.S.
Military, 24% for Congress, 42% for the presidency, and 36 % for the television news. Public
Opinion of the Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/releases/pr001201b.asp (Dec. 1, 2000). Interestingly, Gallup noted a sharply increased
partisan divide in public perception of the Supreme Court following the decision in Bush v.
Gore:

Those who identify as Democrats showed a slight drop in confidence in the Supreme Court
between June and December, from 44% with 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence
during June, to 40% during December. Independents also showed a very slight loss of faith
in the Supreme Court as well, from 48% to 45%. Republicans, however, showed a large in
crease in confidence, from 48% during June to 67% during the days following the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. In short, views of the nation's highest court became more
politicized - at least in the short term - during the time period in which the court made the
highly controversial decision that gave George W. Bush the presidency.

May 2001]

The 2000 Presidential Election

1297

vincingly is not, as When Elections Go Bad perhaps implies, the prod
uct of some institutional defect. The Supreme Court has, at other im
portant junctures in history, played an important role in safeguarding
American democracy.71 It can and will do so again. In the meantime,
let us not throw out the baby with the bathwater.

Jeffrey M. Jones, Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court has Become More Po liticiz ed, GALLUP
NEWS SERVICE, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010103b.asp(Jan. 3, 2001).
71. The unanimity of the desegregation decisions provides one important example. See,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483(1954). The Nixon tapes case is another. See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683(1974).
e. g. ,

